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IF YOU'RE SMOKING YOU'RE FIRED: HOW TOBACCO




It was at a benefits meeting in 2003 that Howard Weyers, president and
owner of Okemos, Michigan based Weyco, announced a new company
policy: "As of January 1, 2005, anyone that has nicotine in their body
will be fired."1  Employees of Weyco, ironically an insurance and
medical benefits company, responded to this announcement with shock
and anger arguing "you can't do that to us" and "that's not legal.",
2
We'ers' response to his employees' outrage: "Yes I can," and "yes it
is." Weyers was correct as Michigan has no law that prevents an
employer from terminating an employee simply because they use
tobacco.4 As Weyers put it, "I pay the bills around here. So I'm going
to set the expectations." 5 "You can do whatever you want, but if you're
going to work here, you can't be a smoker like you can't be a drug
user."
6
* DePaul University College of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2007; Ohio University,
B.B.A., 1999. The author wishes to thank his wife Katherine and his family for all of
their love and support, John Rinn and The Daily Show for helping to inspire the
article, and the entire DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW Editorial Board.
Morley Safer, Whose Life Is it Anyway, CBS NEWS, Oct. 30, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/10/28/60minutes/main990617. shtml.
2 Id.; Mary Snow, No Smoking, CNN.COM, Jan. 26, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/01/26/no.smoking/index.html.
3 Safer, supra note 1.
4 Id.; This may however change in the future as on April 13, 2005 a bill was
introduced in the Michigan state senate that would "prohibit employers from making
employment decisions based upon certain conduct that is unrelated to employment,"
where the "employee engages in, or is regarded as engaging in, a lawful activity that
is both off the employer's premises and during nonwork hours." S.B. 381, 93rd Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Mich., 2005); The bill is presently assigned to the Committee on
Government Operations. Michigan Legislature, Senate Bill 0381,
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(52dwcz451nssmt55wjimzd3n)/mileg.aspx?page=BillSt
atus&objectname=2005-SB-0381 (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
5 Safer, supra note 1; see also News Release, Howard Weyers, Why Business Should
Get Serious About Smoking (Feb. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.weyco.com/web/company/news/020720050001.jsp
6 Barbara Wieland, Okemos Firm Bans All Smoking, LANsING ST. J., Oct. 2, 2004, at
IA.
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
Weyco gave its employees fifteen months to quit smoking and
offered assistance in smoking cessation programs including
acupuncture and hypnosis. 7 According to the company, as many as
fourteen employees quit before the no-smoking policy went into
effect. 8 Since January 1, 2005, at least four employees have been
terminated for refusing to take an anti-smoking test. While Weyco has
received a great deal of attention for taking this drastic measure, it is
not the only company to take a strong stance against employees'
smoking habits.
Scotts Miracle-Gro, a lawn care company based in Marysville,
Ohio, announced in late 2005 a policy effective in October 2006 that
smoking, even when off-duty, will cost employees their jobs. 10 The
chairman and chief executive of Scotts, James Hagedorn, said this
dramatic action was taken because the company, which pays for
medical claims using its own funds, wants to hold down health
insurance costs by helping people live healthy lifestyles.'' The
company is giving its employees one year to quit smoking and is
offering free counseling, nicotine patches, and cessation classes to help
them do so.12 Scotts' no-smoking mandate is part of a broader effort by
the company to control health care costs. The company has also
recently opened a $5 million fitness and medical facility for
employees. 3 Scotts has also made changes in its cafeteria by cuttting
down on fried foods and offering baked salmon and other fish, while
the vending machines now dispense more healthful snacks.
14
Still other companies, while not firing employees for smoking,
are refusing to hire smokers altogether, charging employees who smoke
more for health insurance or offering perks such as lower health
insurance rates to employees who do not smoke.' 5 A recent survey by
7 Katie Merx, Workers' Unhealthy Habits Could Cost Them; Companies Look to Save
on Insurance, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 17, 2005, at Business and Financial News.
8 Weyco Fires 4 Employees for Refusing Smoking Test, LANSING ST. J., Jan. 25, 2005,
at Local lB.
9 Id.; Safer, supra note 1.
10 Monique Curet & Ken Stammen, Scotts Miracle-Gro Joins List of Companies Who




14 Ilan Brat, Ohio Company Tells Smokers: Kick the Habit or You'll be Fired: More
Corporations Moving to Cut Health Care Costs, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, at
Al.
15 One of the primary questions raised by employers charging employees different
rates for health insurance is whether or not this complies with the Health Insurance
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Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), namely the HIPAA
nondiscrimination requirements under the portability provisions. On the Department
of Labor's website addressing frequently asked questions about the HIPAA
nondiscrimination requirements the following question and answer were provided:
QUESTION: I am an employer that offers a premium differential
between smokers and nonsmokers. That is, smokers pay more for
coverage than nonsmokers. How do the bona fide wellness program
provisions relate to my plan?
ANSWER: The plan is offering a reward based on an individual's
ability to stop smoking. Medical evidence seems to suggest that
smoking may be related to a health factor. (Under the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, nicotine addiction is a medical
condition, and a report of the Surgeon General stated that scientists in
the field of drug addiction agree that nicotine, a substance common to
all forms of tobacco, is a powerfully addictive drug.) Therefore, for the
plan to maintain the premium differential and not be considered to
discriminate based on a health factor, such a program would be
required to meet the requirements for a bona fide wellness program.
Under the proposed rules, there are four requirements to be a bona fide
wellness program:
The total reward that may be given to an individual is limited. The
departments invited comments on the appropriate level of the reward,
suggesting that a limit of 10-20 percent of the total cost of employee-
only coverage may be appropriate.
The program must be reasonably designed to promote good health or
prevent disease for individuals in the program.
The reward must be available to all similarly situated individuals. More
specifically, the program must allow any individual for whom it is
unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition to meet the wellness
program standard (or for whom it is medically inadvisable to attempt to
meet the wellness program standard) an opportunity to satisfy a
reasonable alternative standard.
All plan materials describing the terms of the program must disclose the
availability of a reasonable alternative standard.
Accordingly, under the proposed rules, the wellness program would be
a bona fide wellness program if the premium differential is not more
than 10-20 percent of the total cost of employee-only coverage; the
program accommodates individuals for whom it is unreasonably
difficult to quit using tobacco products due to addiction by providing a
reasonable alternative standard (such as a discount in return for
attending
2007]
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Hewitt, a human resources consulting firm, showed that forty-one
percent of 950 U.S. based employers used some form of financial
educational classes or for trying a nicotine patch); and plan materials
that describe the premium differential describe the availability of a
reasonable alternative standard to qualify for the lower premium.
U.S. Department of Labor Employee Benefits Security Administration, Frequently
Asked Questions About the HIPAA Nondiscrimination Requirements,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/FAQs/faqhipaaND.html (last visited Mar: 26, 2006). See
29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (2005), 45 C.F.R. § 146.121 (2005); For an example of how this
would be permissible see DykemaGossett, How HIPAA Non-Discrimination Rules
Could Affect Your Company's Health Management Efforts, Employment Law
Developments, Oct. 2005, at 2-3, available at
http://www.dykema.com/labor/news/elawl 005.pdf.
Another example is a group health plan that requires all plan
participants to certify each plan year that they have not used tobacco
products in the preceding twelve months. Participants who do not
provide certification are assessed a surcharge that is 20% of the cost of
employee-only coverage. However, all plan materials describing the
terms of the wellness program include the following statement: "If it is
unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition for you to meet the
requirements under this program (or if it is medically inadvisable for
you to attempt to meet the requirements of this program), we will make
available a reasonable alternative standard for you to avoid this
surcharge." If an employee notifies the plan that it is unreasonably
difficult for him to stop smoking cigarettes due to an addiction to
nicotine (a medical condition), the plan accommodates the employee by
requiring the employee to participate in a smoking cessation program to
avoid the surcharge. The employee can avoid the surcharge for as long
as the employee participates in the smoking cessation program,
regardless of whether the employee stops smoking (as long as the
employee continues to be addicted to nicotine. In this Example, the
premium surcharge is permissible as a bona fide wellness program
because it satisfies the four requirements of the proposed regulations.
First, the program complies with the limit on rewards under the
program. Second, it is reasonably designed to promote good health or
prevent disease by doing the certification on an annual basis. Third, the
reward under the program is available to all similarly situated
individuals because it accommodates individuals for whom it is
unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition to quit using tobacco
products by providing a reasonable alternative standard. Fourth, the
plan discloses in all materials describing the program the availability of
a reasonable alternative standard. Thus, the premium surcharge does
not violate HIPAA's non-discrimination rules.
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incentives or penalties in their health care plans.16 It is estimated that
eight to ten percent of the surveyed businesses aimed some of these
incentives or penalties at smokers, and that percentage is growing.
1 7
For example, in April 2005, Humana, a health insurer based in
Louisville, Kentucky, began to offer a $5 per pay period bonus to its
employees who indicated they had not used tobacco in the past twelve
months.' 8 General Mills, on the other hand, charges a $20 per month
surcharge on the health benefits of smokers.' 9 Likewise, Gannett
Company, Inc., the McLean Washington based publisher of USA Today
and ninety-eight other newspapers, announced that during re-
enrollment of benefits in January 2006 each of its 40,000 employees
nationwide would be asked whether he smoked.2 0 Those who stated
that they did would be given the choice of either enrolling in a
company-funded cessation program or paying a $50 surcharge fee each
month for health insurance.2 ' Other companies have also followed this
trend including PepsiCo., which charges its employees who use tobacco
an additional $100 premium annually for health insurance, and grocery
store chain Meijer Inc. and Northwest Airlines. 2 In fact, the practice
of smoker surcharges is becoming such a significant trend that in 2006
it will become part of Hewitt's annual survey of companies' current and
future health care plans.
2 3
The practice of charging smokers more for health insurance is
not limited to the private sector. Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, and
West Virginia all impose a health insurance surcharge for government
employees who smoke. 24 Alabama charges employees who smoke an
extra $20 a month for health insurance per employee contract.2 ' This
charge applies whether it is the employee or anyone else covered under
the contract, such as a spouse, who smokes. 26 Georgia, on the other
hand, charges $40 a month for smokers covered by the state's health
16 Lisa Cornwell, Employers Charging Smokers Extra for Health Insurance,
MSNBC.cOM, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1 1394043/.
17 Id
18 Brat, supra note 14.
19 Id.
20 Marguerite Higgins, Gannett Smokers to Pay, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at C07.
21 id
22 Cornwell, supra note 16.
23 Id.
24 Sharon Terlep, Lighting up Could Be Hazardous to Your Co-Pay, DETROIT NEWS,
Dec. 2, 2005, at Al.
25 Cornwell, supra note 16.
26 Id.
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plan.2 7 If employees in Georgia are caught lying on their insurance
form about smoking, they could lose their insurance for up to a year.
28
Still, other employers have taken a different approach by simply
not hiring smokers. For example, Alaska Airlines has not hired
smokers since the 1980s, and both Alaska Airlines and Union Pacific
screen applicants for their smoking status in states where it is legal to
do SO. 29  Further, the World Health Organization announced in
December 2005 a new hiring policy that would reject all applicants
who smoke. 30  According to the American Civil Liberties Union's
National Workrights Institute ("NWI") a 1998 survey conducted by the
Administrative Management Society found that more than 6,000
companies, or six percent of all employers nationwide, refused to hire
smokers, and the NWI is certain this number has since increased.3'
In an effort to control costs, employers increasingly have
scrutinized the behaviors and lifestyle choices of employees. Chief
among employers' concerns are smokers. The questions this raises are
whether employers have gone too far and are impermissibly interfering
with the personal lives of their employees, or whether employers
should be entitled to make employment decisions based on whether an
individual is a smoker.
This Comment proposes that employees should not be entitled
to protection from any form of employment discrimination based on
whether they smoke. Part Two will examine the current status and
trends of health insurance and health care costs in the United States,
and the role that employers play in providing this coverage. Part Three
will examine the true costs of smoking both in human and economic
terms. Part Four will analyze whether there is a legal right to smoke
and whether smokers constitute a distinct class for equal protection
purposes. Part Five will explore whether smoking, or nicotine
addiction, is a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") and will examine whether smokers could be regarded as
disabled under the Act. Part Six of this Comment will survey the
relevant state statutes in place that offer smokers protection from
employment discrimination and analyze the origins and value of these
27 Id.
28 id.
29 Higgins, supra note 20.
30 Business and Legal Reports, WHO Stops Hiring Smokers, Dec. 12, .2005,
http://hr.blr.com/display.cftn/id/17118 (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
31 The National Workrights Institute, NWI Lifestyle Discrimination Legislative Brief,
http://www.workrights.org/issuelifestyle/ld-legislative-brief.html (last visited Mar.
18, 2006).
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statutes. Finally, Part Seven of this Comment will evaluate whether
permitting employers to discriminate against smokers will subsequently
permit employers to intrude further into an employee's personal life.
II. THE RISING COST OF HEALTH CARE
The majority of Americans less than sixty-five years of age receive
their health insurance coverage through their employer. 32 This equates
to employer-sponsored health insurance currently providing coverage
for 160 million Americans, nearly three out of every five of the non-
elderly.33  Health insurance has become one of the most important
fringe benefits offered by employers, but the numbers of employers
offering health insurance is declining. 34 Overall there has been a nine
percent decrease in the past five years with sixty percent of firms
offering health insurance benefits, down from sixty-nine percent in
2000. 3 5  While ninety-eight percent of firms with 200 or more
employees offered health benefits in 2005, only fifty-four Ipercent of
small firms with 3 to 199 employees offered health benefits.
32 Julie Appleby, Fewer Getting Insurance Through Job, Aug. 3, 2004,
USATODAY.COM, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-08-03-health-
insurance x.htm. According to a 2003 survey conducted by the Center for Studying
Health System Change sixty-three percent of those under age sixty-five received
health insurance through their employer, down from sixty-seven percent in 2001,
resulting in 9 million fewer people with employer coverage. This same survey found
that only twelve percent of those surveyed received public insurance with another ten
percent having other private insurance or coverage, and the remaining fifteen percent
of the population was uninsured. Id.; THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND
HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATION TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2005
ANNUAL SURVEY 1, (2005), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/upload/7315.pdf [hereinafter KAISER].
33 KAISER, supra note 32.
34 See J. LEE HARGRAVES, TRENDS IN HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ACCESS
AMONG BLACK, LATINO, AND WHITE AMERICANS, 2001-2003 1, (2004) available at
http://hschange.org/CONTENT/713/713.pdf According to this report all Americans
saw a decrease in access to employer-sponsored health insurance from 2001-2003.
Id.; KAISER, supra note 32; Appleby, supra, note 32.
35 KAISER, supra note 32 at 32, 34.
36 Id. at 32. The smallest firms are the least likely to offer health insurance with only
forty-seven percent of firms with three to nine employees offering health insurance
compared with seventy-two pervent of firms with ten to twenty-four employees
offering health insurance, eighty-seven percent of firms with twenty-five to forty-nine
offering health insurance and nearly all employers with fifty or more employees
offering coverage. Id.
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In addition to a decrease in the overall availability of employer-
subsidized health insurance, Americans have also been burdened with
rapidly increasing health care costs. In 2005, health insurance
premiums for families increased 9.2 percent, marking the first time
since 2000 that there was a less than double-digit percentage increase in
the cost of health insurance premiums.37 This increase was almost six
percent more than the overall rate of inflation (3.5 percent) and was
slightly more than six percent of the increase in workers' wages (2.7
percent).38 Since 2000 the cost of health insurance in the United States
has increased by seventy-three percent with the average cost of family
coverage now reaching $10,880 per year, an amount which would
exceed the annual gross earnings of a minimum wage worker who is
employed full-time throughout the year.39
Even with these increases, the percentage of the employee paid
portion of health insurance premiums has remained steady as
employees continue to pay an average of sixteen percent across plan
types for single coverage and twenty-six percent across plan types for
family coverage.4 ° Virtually all covered workers receive a premium
contribution of fifty percent or more from their employer, with the
majority of workers receiving a premium contribution between
seventy-five and one hundred percent for single coverage and fifty and
one hundred percent for family coverage. 41 Across all plans, while the
average employee contributed $610 annually to a single-employee plan,
the employer paid an average of $3,413.42 Likewise, for a family plan,
37 Id. at 16. Premiums increased 10.9 percent in 2001, 12.9 percent in 2002, 13.9
percent in 2003, and 11.2 percent in 2004. The study did point out that this was the
second year in a row where the percentage increase in health insurance premiums has
declined. Id.38 
id.
39 Id. In fact the estimated total health care bill for the nation by 2015 is estimated to
be $14 billion with consumers footing about half of the bill. Overall analysts forecast
a 7.2 percent annual increase in health care costs over the coming decade,
significantly higher than the 5.1 percent predicted growth rage of the economy over
the next decade. Kevin Freking, Analysts: Health Care Costs to Keep Rising, ABC
NEWs, Feb 21, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id= 1648478&CMP=-OTC-RSSFeeds0312.
40 KAISER, supra note 32, at 60. The average monthly worker contribution for single
coverage in 2005 was $51 with the average contribution for family coverage was
$226. Id.
41 Id. This report also contains an in depth breakdown of the percentages paid by
firms for single and family coverage. Id. at 66-67.42 Id. at 62.
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the average employee contribution was $2,713 with employers
contributing an average of $8,167.
4 3
With rapidly increasing health care costs, the majority of which
are subsidized by employers, it should come as no surprise that
employers are increasingly looking for ways to control costs. One only
needs to look at recent headlines to understand why the issue of health
care costs has become such a critical concern for business. In recent
months two of the largest automobile manufacturers in the United
States have announced plans for massive reductions in their workforces
and numerous plant closings. 44 General Motors announced in late 2005
that they would eliminate up to 30,000 jobs and close part or all of a
dozen installations over the following three years in an effort to help
reverse over $2 billion in losses. 45 In addition to earlier reductions in
health care benefits these cutbacks were expected to reduce costs for
General Motors by $7 billion by the end of 2006.46 Additionally,
General Motors has reached a tentative agreement with the United Auto
Workers, the union representing blue-collar workers, that will cause
many current General Motors employees' co-pays to increase and will
impose health benefit cuts on union retirees.
47
Similarly, in January 2006 Ford Motor Company announced its
plan to reduce its workforce by up to 30,000 jobs and close as many as
fourteen plants. 48 Again, one of the primary reasons cited for the
company's financial difficulties was increasing health care costs.
49
Ford estimated that its 2005 health care costs would reach $3.5 billion
based in part on the benefits it pays for 550,000 active and retired
hourly workers and dependents in the United States. 50 Like General
43 Id. In HMO plans employees receiving single coverage paid an average of $563
while employers paid $3,203 for coverage and employees paid on average $2,604 for
family coverage while employers paid $7,852. In PPO plans employees paid an
average of $603 for health insurance while employers contributed $3,547, and
employees paid an average of $2,641 while employers contributed $8,449 to health
insurance costs. Id
44 See Micheline Maynard & Vikas Bajaj, G.M Set to Drop 5,000 More Jobs and
Shut Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at Al; Micheline Maynard, Ford
Eliminating Up to 30, 000 Jobs and 14 Factories, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at Al.
45 Maynard & Bajaj, supra note 44.
46 id.
47 Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, Union Offers Details of Health Deal with G.M.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, at C3.
48 Maynard, supra note 44.
49 id.
50 Ford to Save $850 Million in New Health Care Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at
C4.
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Motors, Ford has recently entered into a new agreement with the
United Auto Workers labor union. Under Ford's new agreement,
current employees will divert ninety-nine cents an hour in future wage
increases to a health fund, while retirees will pay as much as $752 a
year per family for medical coverage in an effort to save Ford as much
as $850 million annually.5' These examples clearly illustrate why
health care costs have become a critical economic concern for
employers. Moreover, when one examines the true costs of smoking,
one can easily understand why employers are focusing on reducing or
terminating employees who smoke to reduce health care costs.
IlI. THE "COST" OF SMOKING
Smoking is an extremely dangerous and harmful behavior that
continues to exert a tremendous human and economic toll on society.
In addition to smokers who directly harm themselves by ingesting
cigarette smoke, all non-smokers are susceptible to the harms produced
by environmental tobacco smoke (i.e., secondhand smoke) with tens of
thousands of non-smokers dying each year as a result of secondhand
smoke. According to the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC")
smoking is the number one cause of preventable deaths in the United
States, causing an estimated 438,000 premature deaths annually
between 1997 and 2001. 53 Smoking accounts for one in every five
deaths in the United States - more than HIV, illegal drug use, alcohol
use, motor vehicle injuries, suicides and murders combined.54
51 Id.
52 See American Lung Association, Secondhand Smoke Fact Sheet
http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c=dvLUK900E&b=35422 (last visited Feb. 27,
2007). Secondhand smoke has been classified by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) as a known cause of cancer in humans. Secondhand smoke is
estimated to cause approximately 3,400 lung cancer deaths and 22,700-69,600 heart
disease deaths in adult nonsmokers in the United States annually. Secondhand smoke
is also responsible for between 150,000 and 300,000 lower respiratory tract infections
in children under eighteen months of age resulting in 7,500 and 15,000
hospitalizations each year, and causes 1,900 to 2,700 sudden infant death syndrome
(SIDS) deaths in the United States annually. Id.
53 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ANNUAL SMOKING-ATTRIBUTABLE MORTALITY,
YEARS OF POTENTIAL LIFE LOST, AND PRODUCTIVITY LOSSES 1997-2001, MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, Jul. 1, 2005, at 625, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5425.pdf
54 Center for Disease Control, Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking - Fact Sheet,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/factsheets/HealthEffectsofCigaretteSmokingFactsheet.h
tm (last visited Mar. 17, 2006). Among the other harms of smoking include an
[VOL. 10.3:457
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But the quantification of the "cost" of smoking is not only
measurable in human terms, but also in economic terms. In terms of
productivity losses, the CDC reports that cigarette smoking and
exposure to tobacco smoke costs the United States an estimated $92
billion annually in lost productivity.5 5  Combined with smoking-
attributable health care costs, which in 1998 were estimated at $75.2
billion, the annual economic cost of smoking exceeds an estimated
$167 billion per year.56 This equates to an average of $3,383 in
economic costs per smoker per year, $1,760 in lost productivity and
$1,623 in excess medical expenditures. 57  Even in the face of the
indisputable evidence of the harms caused to both smokers and non-
smokers by cigarettes, individuals continue to engage in this dangerous
and harmful behavior, with some arguing that there is a right to smoke
and that discrimination based on smoking impermissibly violates equal
protection.
IV. THE RIGHT TO SMOKE AND SMOKERS AS A
SUSPECT CLASS
Very few courts have been asked to address the issue of whether or not
there is a "right to smoke," but those that have been confronted with
this issue have consistently held that no such right exists.58 For
example, in City of North Miami v. Kurtz the Florida Supreme Court
considered whether the Florida state constitution provided applicants
increased risk of lung cancer, as the risk of dying from lung cancer is twenty-two
times higher in men and twelve times higher in women who smoke. Cigarette
smoking also increases the risk for many types of cancer including cancers of the lip,
oral cavity, esophagus, uterine cervix, urinary bladder, and kidney. Cigarette smokers
are two to four times more likely to develop coronary heart disease as are non-
smokers, and cigarette smoking approximately doubles a person's risk of having a
stroke. Respiratory diseases also increase substantially with smoking as about ninety
percent of all the deaths from chronic obstructive lung diseases are attributable to
cigarette smoking. Cigarette smoking also carries with it many adverse reproductive
and childhood effects including an increased risk for infertility, preterm delivery,
stillbirth, low birth weight, and sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). Id.
" CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 53, at 626.
56 Id.
57 Jennifer Barrett Ozols, A Job or a Cigarette?, NEWSWEEK.COM, Feb. 24, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7019590/site/newsweek/.
58 See PUBLIC HEALTH INSTITUTE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL CENTER, THERE IS
No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SMOKE, Feb. 2004, available at
http://www.phi.org/pdf-library/talc-memo-0051.pdf (outlining why there is no such
thing as a "right to smoke" and why smokers are not a protected class).
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seeking government employment a right of privacy as to their smoking
habits. 9  The court held that the right to smoke was clearly not
included in the federal constitution's implicit privacy provisions as they
extended only to such fundamental interests as marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and the rearing and educating of
children.60  The court held that applicants did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, reasoning that individuals must reveal whether
they smoke in almost every aspect of life in today's society.
61
Further support for the conclusion that there is no right to
smoke can be found in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City in which the court held that the
right to smoke was not a fundamental right.62  In this case a trainee
firefighter who was terminated for violating the department's no
smoking policy argued that although there was no specific
constitutional right to smoke, it was implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment that he had a right of liberty or privacy in the conduct of
his private life, which included the right to smoke.63 The Tenth Circuit,
however, disagreed stating that cigarette smoking could be
distinguished from the activities involving liberty or privacy that the
Supreme Court had thus far recognized as fundamental rights.64 While
the Tenth Circuit agreed that indisputably the department's non-
smoking regulation infringed upon the liberty and privacy of the
firefighter trainees, it found that only a rational connection between the
non-smoking regulation and the promotion of the health and safety of
65the firefighter trainees was necessary to uphold the statute. The
Tenth Circuit stated it need look no further for a legitimate purpose and
rational connection than the Surgeon General's warning on the side of
every box of cigarettes that cigarette smoking is hazardous to one's
health and, specifically, that good health and physical conditioning are
essential requirements for firefighters.66
Courts have also held that smokers are not entitled to
heightened equal protection scrutiny as they do not constitute a suspect
59 City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 1995).
60 Id. at 1028.
61 Id. The court illustrated this point by stating that when individuals were seated in
restaurants, checked in to motel rooms, or rented a car they were asked for their
smoking preference so proper accommodations could be made. Id.
62 Grusendorf v. City of Okla.City, 816 F.2d 539, 541 (10th Cir. 1987).
63 id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 541-43.
66 Id. at 543.
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or distinct class. For example, In Brashear v. Simms, the state of
Maryland faced a legal challenge from a state prisoner who argued that
his right to equal protection had been violated by the State's newly-
adopted policies that prohibited smoking within Maryland prisons.67
The court rejected this claim holding that the act of smoking was
entitled to only a minimal level of protection under the Equal
Protection Clause, as it was obviously not a fundamental right, nor was
the classification between smokers and non-smokers a suspect one.
68
Additionally, a New York court in Fagan v. Axelrod considered
the constitutionality of state laws that established a comprehensive plan
regulating tobacco smoking in public areas. 69 The petitioners in Fagan
argued that there existed a right of liberty and privacy to smoke, and
that the statute established irrational classifications and, in other diverse
ways, violated their right to due process and the equal protection of the
laws.7 0 The court held that the regulation of smoking was a valid use of
the State's police power and smoking cigarettes is no more a
fundamental right than shooting up heroin, snorting cocaine or running
a red light.7 1 The court also concluded the state's statutes contained no
differentiation between classes of citizens because those who smoke
had never been legally recognized as a distinct class. 72 Because it is
clear from these decisions that no fundamental right to smoke exists,
nor are smokers a distinct or suspect class, smokers must look
elsewhere for protection from employment discrimination based on
their tobacco use. One potential source of protection for smokers is the
ADA7 3 as smokers, or those addicted to nicotine, could argue that since
alcoholism is considered a disability by the ADA, nicotine addiction
should receive similar treatment.
V. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990 with the express intent
of being the world's first comprehensive civil rights law for persons
with disabilities offering protection in the realm of employment ("Title
I"), public services ("Title II"), public accommodations ("Title III"),
67 Brashear v. Simms, 138 F. Supp. 2d 693, 693-94 (D. Md. 2001).
68 Id. at 694.
69 Fagan v. Axelrod, 550 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554 (1990).
'o Id. at 558.
7" Id. at 559.
72 id.
73 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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and telecommunications ("Title IV"). 74 In enacting the ADA, Congress
responded to the stark fact that some 43 million Americans had at least
one physical or mental disability and that this number is increasing as
the population ages. 75 With the ADA, Congress targeted discrimination
against individuals with disabilities in critical areas including
employment.76 Specifically, the ADA provides that Americans with
disabilities
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected
to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated
to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based
on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals
to participate in, and contribute to, society. 77
A. What Qualifies as a "Disability"?
The ADA defines a disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an]
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment. ' 78 The Supreme Court, in interpreting
the ADA has articulated a distinction between an "impairment" and a
"disability." The Court held in Sutton v. United Airlines that "a
'disability' exists only where an impairment 'substantially limits' a
major life activity, not where it 'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be
substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken."79 The
Court stated in Sutton that "a person whose physical or mental
impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment,
but if the impairment is corrected it does not 'substantially limit' a
major life activity. ' '80 Additionally, the Court noted that "the definition
of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated 'with respect to
74 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: 1990-2002, http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
7' 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(1) (2000).
76 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2000).
77 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
78 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A)-(C) (2000).
79 Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
80 Id. at 483.
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an individual' and be determined based on whether an impairment
substantially limits the 'major life activities of such individual.'81
B. When is an Individual Substantially Limited?
Under the ADA, an impairment is substantially limiting if one is
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or (ii)
significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity.
2
Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity
is determined in light of (i) the nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) the
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term
impact of or resulting from the impairment. 83 For example, "a broken
leg that takes eight weeks to heal is an impairment of fairly brief
duration. However if the broken leg heals improperly, the 'impact' of
the impairment would be the resulting permanent limp." 84 Further,
an individual who had once been able to walk at an
extraordinary speed would not be substantially limited in
the major life activity of walking if, as a result of a physical
impairment, he or she were only able to walk at an average
speed, or even at moderately below average speed. 5
C. What Constitutes a Major Life Activity?
The ADA adopted the definition of the term "major life activities"
found in the regulations implementing Section 504 of the
81 id.
82 29 C.F.R. 1630.20) (2005).
83 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (j)(2)(i)-(iii) (2005).
84 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (2005).
85 Id.
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973." The ADA therefore defines major life
activities as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working., 87 Major life activities have been further described as "those
basic activities that the average person in the general population can
perform with little or no difficulty."
88
The Supreme Court in its interpretation of what qualifies as a
major life activity has developed a seemingly narrower view. In
Toyota Motor Manufacturing of Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Court
held that "major" in the phrase "major life activities" refers to those
activities that are of central importance to daily life. 89  The Court
stated that
In order for performing manual tasks to fit into this
category - a category that includes such basic abilities as
walking, seeing, and hearing - the manual tasks in question
must be central to daily life. If each of the tasks included in
the major life activity of performing manual tasks does not
independently qualify as a major life activity, then together
they must do so.90
The Court reasoned that the term "major life activities" needs to
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled. The Court pointed to the ADA's legislative history, stating
that "If Congress intended everyone with a physical impairment that
precluded the performance of some isolated, unimportant, or
particularly difficult manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of
disabled Americans would surely have been much higher than the
43,000,000 that Congress estimated to be disabled." 91
As the Supreme Court recognized in Sutton, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has been reluctant to
define "major life activities" to include working and has suggested that
working be considered as a last resort, only if an individual is not
86 Id. See 34 C.F.R. 104.3(ii) (2005), Rehabilitation Act of 1973 29 U.S.C. § 794
(2000).
7 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i) (2005).
88 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (2005).
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substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity.9 2 The
ADA does, however, provide that if working is the articulated major
life activity, one's impairment may be substantially limited if one is
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.
93
D. The ADA's Treatment of Alcoholism as a Disability
Because alcoholism is treated as a disability by the ADA, one might
argue that nicotine addiction is analogous to alcohol addiction and
should therefore be treated as a disability by the ADA. Courts,
however, have held that while alcoholism qualifies as an impairment
under the ADA, it is not necessarily a disability. 94 This is because, as
Sutton makes clear, having an impairment does not automatically
equate to having a disability under the ADA. 95 Courts, in fact, have
been unwilling to find alcoholism as a per se disability under the
ADA.96  Additionally, Courts have required past addiction as a
requisite to one's alcoholism qualifying as a disability under the ADA,
92 Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. §
1630.20) (2005). If an individual is substantially limited in any other major life
activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual is substantially
limited in working. Id.
" 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h)(3) (2005).
94 See Bailey v. Ga. Pac. Corp.,306 F.3d 1162, 1167 (1st Cir., 2000); Fed. Express
Corp., 133 F.3d 137, 139 (lst Cir. 1998); Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co., 127 F.3d
270, 273 (2d Cir. 1997); Miners v. Cargill Commc'ns, 113 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.
1997); Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
95 See Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1167; Lessard v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 175 F.3d 193, 197
(1st Cir. 1999); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
96 See Reg'l Economic Cmty Action Plan Inc., v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35,
47 (2d Cir. 2002); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 1997)
(declining to adopt alcoholism as a per se disability because even though plaintiff's
alcoholism "assuredly affected how he lived and worked, "far more [was] required to
trigger coverage under [the ADA]"). Moreover, while the plaintiffs "alcoholism may
have been permanent, he offered no evidence that he suffered from any substantially
limiting impairment of any significant duration." Id.
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while suffering negative effects of alcohol use alone has failed to rise to
the level of a disability.
97
Courts have pointed out that alcoholism, while not specifically
excluded from the ADA's protections, is nevertheless treated differently
from other impairments and disabilities. 98  For example, the ADA
specifically authorizes an employer to prohibit the consumption of
alcohol at the workplace and permits an employer to require that
employees not be under the influence of alcohol at work. 99 In addition,
an employee suffering from alcoholism can be held to the "the same
qualification standards for employment or job performance and
behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any
unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the.. .alcoholism of
such employee."' 00  When courts have found a duty to provide a
reasonable accommodation for an alcoholic, the accommodations have
generally involved a duty for an employer to accommodate a modified
work schedule so an employee could attend Alcoholic Anonymous
meetings or granting a leave of absence so an employee could seek
97 Compare Buckley, 127 F.3d at 274 (holding that past drug addiction, not merely
past drug use is required to make out a claim under the ADA) with Burch, 119 F.3d at
316 n9 (holding that where an alcoholic's only proffered impairments were the
primary result of temporary inebriation, such proof was insufficient to demonstrate a
substantially limiting impairment).
98 Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1167.
9 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(b)(1)-(2) (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(1)-(2)
(2000)). See Martin v. Barnseville Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 209
F.3d 931, 935 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the ADA did not protect a plaintiff fiom
his own bad judgment in drinking on the job nor require a defendant to hire him as a
school bus driver where there was a serious risk that he may again drink on the job,
have an accident, and kill a group of children).
100 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(b)(4) (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2000)). See
Brown v. Lucky Stores, 246 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an
employer is permitted to terminate an alcoholic employee for violating a rational rule
of conduct even if the misconduct was related to the employee's alcoholism); Burch,
119 F.3d at 320 (holding that does not require employers to excuse violations of
uniformly-applied standards of conduct by offering an alcoholic employee a "firm
choice" between treatment and discipline); Carroll v. Ill. Dep't of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities, 979 F. Supp. 767, 770 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that so
long as the reason for discharge was for conduct that any person would have been
disciplined for doing, the fact that alcoholism may have caused the conduct does not
lead to an ADA violation); Rollison v. Gwinnett County, 865 F. Supp. 1564, 1572
(N.D. Ga. 1994) (holding that an employer may hold an alcoholic employee to the
same standards for employment or job performance, as it holds other employees, even
if the unsatisfactory performance is related to the alcoholism).
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treatment for his alcoholism.10' For all other intents and purposes, if an
employee is terminated or disciplined because of his or her conduct,
and not because of his alcoholism, there is no violation of the ADA. 1
02
E. Nicotine Addiction Does Not Qualify as a Disability
1. The Language of the ADA
Simply from the language of the ADA it seems doubtful that Congress
ever intended those addicted to nicotine to be covered by the Act. For
example, Section 12201 of the ADA, which governs its construction
states that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to preclude the
prohibition of, or the imposition of restrictions on, smoking in places of
employment.., in transportation.., or in places of public
accommodation."' 1 3  It seems highly improbable that Congress
intended to treat something as a disability and, at the same time, permit
employers to regulate the activity associated with the disability.
2. Court Decisions Dismissing Nicotine Addiction Claims
On the rare occasions that courts have addressed nicotine addiction as a
disability they have consistently found that smokers are not covered by
the ADA. For example, the plaintiff in Brashear, in addition to
bringing his equal protection claim, alleged that the Maryland state
prison's no-smoking policy violated his federal statutory right to be
free from discrimination under the ADA.104 The district court rejected
this claim holding that "common sense compels the conclusion that
smoking, whether denominated as 'nicotine addition' or not, is not a
'disability' within the meaning of the ADA." 10 5 The court stated that
"Congress could not possibly have intended the absurd result of
l"1 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (requiring that as part
of a reasonable accommodation part-time or modified work schedules); Schmidt v.
Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996 (D. Ore. 1994) (holding that the ADA may
require an employer to provide a leave of absence to an employee with an alcohol
problem, particularly if the employer would provide that accommodation to an
employee with cancer or some other illness requiring medical treatment).
102 See Adamczyk v. Chief of Police, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1331, at *6 (4th Cir.
1998) (police officer's demotion upheld because it was based on his misconduct not
his alcoholism).
113 42 U.S.C. §12201(b) (2000).
104 Brashear v. Simms, 138 F. Supp. 2d 693, 693-94 (D. Md. 2001).
105 Id. at 694-95.
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including smoking within the definition of 'disability,' which would
render somewhere between 25% and 30% of the American public
disabled under federal law because they smoke."' 0 6  The court
concluded that:
both smoking and "nicotine addition" are readily
remediable, either by quitting smoking outright through an
act of willpower (albeit easier for some than others), or by
the use of such items as nicotine patches or nicotine
chewing gum. If the smokers' nicotine addiction is thus
remediable, neither such addiction nor smoking itself
qualifies as a disability within the coverage of the ADA. 
107
This conclusion clearly echoes the Supreme Court's holding in
Sutton that if an individual's impairment can be corrected by mitigating
measures then the impairment does not substantially limit a major life
activity. 18 Because smoking cessation devices do exist, such as
nicotine patches, nicotine chewing gum and prescription drugs, one can
argue that mitigating measures can correct the impairment of nicotine
addiction, disqualifying it from the ADA's definition of a disability.
Perhaps the only state court to confront this issue was the
Michigan appellate court in Stevens v. Inland Water in which the court
affirmed the trial court's decision that smoking or nicotine addiction
was not a disability. 0 9 The facts of Stevens involved a security guard
who was terminated for repeatedly smoking on company property and
refusing to quit smoking altogether. 110 The security guard brought a
suit under the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act ("HCRA")
claiming that he was wrongfully terminated.' The court held that
"even if [the] plaintiffs addiction to nicotine affected his 'ability to
106 Id. at 695.
107 Id.; see also Rose v. Home Depot U.S.A. Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, (D. Md.
2002).
'0' Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
109 Stevens v. Inland Waters, Inc., 559 N.W.2d 61, 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
110 Id
111 MICH COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 37.1101-1607 (2006). The court in Stevens stated
that the purpose of the HCRA was similar to the purposes of the ADA in that its
purpose was to ensure that all persons be accorded equal opportunities to obtain
employment, housing, and the utilization of public accommodations, services, and
facilities. Stevens, 559 N.W.2d at 63. The court further stated that The HCRA's
definition of "handicap," and the ADA's definition of "disability" shared the
requirement that a handicap or disability must be a condition that substantially limits"
one or more of a person's "major life activities." Id. at 63-64.
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choose not to smoke' and limited his 'body's ability to be without
discomfort when not smoking,' it did not substantially limit his life's
major activities" because "his smoking and addiction to nicotine did
not interfere with caring for himself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, or working.""'  The
court noted that the plaintiffs argument that nicotine addiction was like
alcoholism ignored the fact that alcoholism was included in the
HCRA's defmition of a "handicap," while nicotine addiction was not."
3
Further, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs claimed "handicap" was
shared by countless other individuals in the workplace and in society as
a whole. 1 4  The court concluded that to automatically label nicotine
addiction as a condition that substantially impairs a major life activity
would be inconsistent with the HCRA and would do a gross disservice
to the truly handicapped. 115
3. Determinations of Government Agencies
Other government agencies, such as the Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD"), have also concluded that smoking is not
a disability warranting protection under the ADA. 1 6 Currently HUD
has no policy that prohibits public housing authorities or Section 8
landlords from banning smoking in individual residential units.'
There are at least two HUD opinions which permit a public housing
authority to ban smoking in public housing developments. In one of
these opinions, HUD stated that the right to smoke is not protected
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any other HUD enforced civil
rights authorities.
1 18
What these decisions illustrate is that nicotine addiction fails to
qualify as a disability and is therefore not entitled protection under the
ADA. Although nicotine addiction may be considered an impairment,
smoking, regardless of its addictiveness, is ultimately a voluntary
i2 Id. at 64.
l13Id
114 Id. at 65.
115 id
116 SUSAN SCHOENMARKLIN, THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY, INC.,
ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHORITY OF HOUSING AUTHORITIES AND SECTION 8 MULTIUNIT
HOUSING OWNERS TO ADOPT SMOKE-FREE POLICIES IN THEIR RESIDENTIAL UNITS 2
(2005), available at http://www.tcsg.org/sfelp/publichousing24E577.pdf.
117 Id.
118 Id.; In re the City of Fort Pierce, Florida Housing Authority, HUD Opinion (July 9,
1996).
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behavior. One might argue that those who advance claims that
smoking, or nicotine addiction, should qualify as a disability under the
ADA are in fact insulting those who are actually disabled and in need
of the protection the ADA was intended to provide. Although the ADA
offers no protection for smokers from employment discrimination
based on their tobacco use, smokers can find protection at the state
level of currently thirty states and the District of Columbia have
enacted statutes protecting smokers from employment
discrimination.' 19
VI. STATE LAWS PROTECTING SMOKERS FROM
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. States Statutes Protecting the Use of Tobacco
Twenty of the thirty-one statutes protecting current or prospective
employees from various forms of discrimination contain language
making it impermissible to discriminate against individuals specifically
because of their use of tobacco products. 120 Some of these statutes
refer to smoking specifically and also include tobacco usage, while
others are worded generally, covering the use of tobacco and tobacco
products.12  Of the twenty state laws specifically prohibiting
119 See American Lung Association, State Smoker Protection Laws,
http://slati.lungusa.org/appendixfasp (last visited Jan. 9, 2007) for a comprehensive
listing of the state statutes.
120 See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-601.02 (LexisNexis 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-
40(s) (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1703.03 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-4-1
(LexisNexis 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (LexisNexis 2005); LA REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23:966 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (2005); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (2005); Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.145 (2005), N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 275:37-a (LexisNexis 2005), N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:6B-1 (2005); N.M. STAT.
ANN § 50-11-3 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 500 (West 2005); OR. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 659A.315 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.10-14 (2005); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-1-85 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. §
2.2-2902 (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-19 (2005), WYo. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105
(2005).
121 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. §31-40(s) (2004):
No employer or agent of any employer shall require, as a condition of
employment, that any employee or prospective employee refrain from
smoking or using tobacco products outside the course of his
employment, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
for smoking or using tobacco products outside the course of his
employment.
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employment discrimination based on the use of tobacco, the Arizona
and Virginia statutes apply exclusively to public employers; thus,
private employers in Arizona and Virginia may discriminate against
current or prospective employees based on tobacco usage. 122 Further,
three states, Arizona, Louisiana, and South Dakota, only offer
protection to current employees and do not prevent an employer from




and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §23:966(A) (2005):
As long as an individual, during the course of employment, complies
with applicable law and any adopted workplace policy regulating
smoking, it shall be unlawful for an employer: (1) To discriminate
against the individual with respect to discharge, compensation,
promotion, any personnel action or other condition, or privilege of
employment because the individual is a smoker or nonsmoker. (2) To
require, as a condition of employment, that the individual abstain from
smoking or otherwise using tobacco products outside the course of
employment. B. A smoker, as referred to herein, is limited to a person
who smokes tobacco.
Id.
with S.C. CODE ANN. §41-1-85 (2005) ("The use of tobacco products outside the
workplace must not be the basis of personnel action, including, but not limited to,
employment, termination, demotion, or promotion of an employee.") and ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit.26 § 597 (2005):
An employer or an agent of an employer may not require, as a
condition of employment, that any employee or prospective employee
refrain from using tobacco products outside the course of that
employment or otherwise discriminate against any person with respect
to the person's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment for using tobacco products outside the course of
employment as long as the employee complies with any workplace
policy concerning use of tobacco.
Id.
122 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-601.02(F) (LexisNexis 2005); VA. CODE ANN.
§2.2-2902 (2005).
123 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-601.02(F) (LexisNexis 2005) ("No state employer
may discriminate against any employee or other person on the basis of the use or
nonuse of tobacco products.").
(The use of "other person" in the statute's language may arguably make it applicable
to prospective employees.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §23:966(A) (2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §60-4-11 (2005) ("It is a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an
employer to terminate the employment of an employee due to that employee's
engaging in any use of tobacco products off the premises of the employer during
nonworking hours.")
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B. State Statutes Protecting the Use of Lawful Products
Instead of enacting statutes specifically aimed at providing users of
tobacco products some form of employment discrimination protection,
nine states have enacted laws that protect employees or prospective
employees from discrimination based on the use of lawful products.
124
Generally, the statutes term these products as "lawful products,"
"lawful consumable products," or phrase the statute to offer protection
for the "legal use of consumable products."' 125 Most of these statutes do
not provide a specific definition of what a "lawful product" or
"consumable product" is Those states with definitions of these
products define them as "a product that is legally consumed, used, or
enjoyed and includes food, beverages, and tobacco' 126 or "products
whose use or enjoyment is lawful and which are consumed during use
or enjoyment, and includes food, alcoholic or nonalcoholic beverages,
and tobacco."'127 Of the nine states that provide a definition of a lawful
or consumable product only Tennessee's statute applies only to current
124 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5 (LexisNexis 2005), MrNN. STAT. ANN. §
181.938 (West 2005), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.145 (West 2005), MONT. CODE ANN. §
39-2-313 (2005), NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.333 (LexisNexis 2005), N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 201-d (Consol. 2005), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2005), TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 50-1-304 (2005 LexisNexis), Wis. STAT. ANN. §§111.31, 111.321-22, 111.325
(West 2005).
125 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 55/5(a) (2005) "it shall be unlawful for an
employer to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise disadvantage
any individual, with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment because the individual uses lawful products off the premises of the
employer during nonworking hours"; MINN. STAT. § 181.938 (West 2005):
An employer may not refuse to hire a job applicant or discipline or
discharge an employee because the applicant or employee engages in or
has engaged in the use or enjoyment of lawful consumable products, if
the use or enjoyment takes place off the premises of the employer
during nonworking hours.
Id.;
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2)(b) (Consol. 2005) ("an individual's legal use of
consumable products prior to the beginning or after the conclusion of the employee's
work hours.").
126 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313(1) (2005).
127 MINN. STAT. §181.938(Subd 2) (West 2005).
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employees, while the other eight statutes apply to both current and
prospective employees. 
21
C. State Statutes Protecting Lawful Conduct
Three states, California, Colorado, and North Dakota base their statutes
on an employee's conduct as opposed to protecting tobacco specifically
or lawful products.1 29 These statutes all make it impermissible for an
employer to terminate an employee for engaging in any lawful activity
off of the employer's premises during nonworking hours. 130  While
California and North Dakota protect both current and prospective
employees, the Colorado statute protects only current employees from
employment discrimination based on participation in lawful conduct.'31
D. Exceptions for Certain Employers
Many of the statutes contain exceptions for various organizations
whose missions conflict with permitting employees to use tobacco or
other lawful products. For example, nonprofit organizations or
corporations whose primary purpose is to discourage the use of tobacco
or other lawful products by the general public are exempt. 132  Other
128 TENN. CODE ANN. §50-1-304 (e)(1)-(2) (West 2005). Tennessee's statute is the
most obscurely written stating that:
(1)No employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for
participating or engaging in the use of an agricultural product not
regulated by the alcoholic beverage commission that is not otherwise
proscribed by law, if such employee participates or engages in such use
in a manner that complies with all applicable employer policies
regarding such use during times at which such employee is working.
(2) No employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for
participating or engaging in the use of such product not regulated by
the alcoholic beverage commission that is not otherwise proscribed by
law if such employee participates or engages in such activity during
times when such employee is not working.
Id.
129 CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k), 98.6 (Deering 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-402.5(1)
(2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005).
130 CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k), 98.6 (Deering 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-402.5(1)
(2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005).
131 CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k), 98.6 (Deering 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-402.5(1)
(2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005).
132 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §31-40(s)(a) (2004); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5(b) (2005)
("any employer that is a non-profit organization that, as one of its primary purposes or
objectives, discourages the use of one or more lawful products by the general
public."); Mo. REV. STAT. §290.145 (2005) ("Religious organizations and church-
2007]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
states exempt organizations whose purpose is to dissuade the public
from using tobacco under other statutorily created exceptions.
California's statute is demonstrative of this as it provides that an
employee is exempt from protection under the statute for "conduct that
is actually in direct conflict with the essential enterprise-related
interests of the employer and where breach of that contract would
actually constitute a material and substantial disruption of the
employer's operation.' ' 133  Additionally, in agreement with the logic
demonstrated by the court in Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City,
some statutes exclude from protection members of fire and police
departments. 1
34
E. Exceptions for Differences in Insurance Rates
operated institutions, and not-for-profit organizations whose principal business is
health care promotion shall be exempt from the provisions of this section."); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-313(3)(c) (2005) ("an employer that is a nonprofit organization
that, as one of its primary purposes or objectives, discourages the use of one or more
lawful products by the general public."); R.I. GEN. LAWS §23-20.10-14(a) (2005 )
("Any employer that is a nonprofit organization which as one of its primary purposes
or objectives discourages the use of tobacco products by the general public."); W. VA.
CODE §21-3-19(b) (LexisNexis 2005) ("an employer which is a nonprofit
organization which, as one of its primary purposes or objectives, discourages the use
of one or more tobacco products by the general public"); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§11 1.35(1)(a) -(b) (West 2005) ("a nonprofit corporation that, as one of its primary
purposes or objectives, discourages the general public from using a lawful product.").
133 CAL. LAB. CODE §98.6(2)(A) (Deering 2005); California's statute only applies
where as part of a collective bargaining agreement or employment contract an
applicant must sign a contract that protects the employer's interest. Id; Other statutes
such as Colorado's also possibly exempts such organizations where it "[i]s necessary
to avoid a conflict of interest with any responsibilities to the employer or the
appearance of such a conflict of interest." COLO. REV .STAT. §24-34-402.5(1)(b)
(2005); Another example would be New Jersey's statute that exempts employees
from coverage if "the employer has a rational basis for doing so which is reasonably
related to the employment." N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:6B-1 (West 2005).
134 See CAL. LAB. CODE §98.6(2)(B) (exempting firefighters); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§31-40(s)(b) (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §60-4-11 (2005) (exempting full-time
firefighters); VA. CODE ANN. §2.2-2902 (2005) (exempting firefighters and police
officers); WIS STAT. ANN. §111.35(4) (West 2005) (excluding fire fighters "if the
applicants use of a lawful product consists of smoking tobacco."); Another relatively
common exception is if the prohibition of tobacco use "[r]elates to a bona fide
occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment
activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a particular group of
employees." See COLO. REv. STAT. §24-34-402.5(1) (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
181.938 (West 2005). One illustration of this might be a chocolate manufacturer who
is concerned that line workers' tobacco residue could infiltrate and degrade the
quality of its product.
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Ten of the state statutes specifically exclude charging higher premiums
to employees for health, life or disability insurance on the basis of their
use of tobacco or other lawful products.135 The general requirement of
these statutes is that the different rates charged to employees actually
reflect the differential cost to the employer and that the employer
makes this information available to the employee. 136 At least one other
state, Kentucky, has created an exception to its statute that states "a
difference in employee contribution rates for smokers and nonsmokers
under this plan shall not be deemed to be an unlawful practice in
violation of [the statute].' 37
F. Why State Statutes Protecting Smokers were Enacted
1. An Unlikely Pairing
It is somewhat puzzling why a state legislature would utilize its
resources to pass legislation aimed at protecting smokers. That
135 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5(c) (2005); MINN. STAT. §181.938 3(c) (2005); Mo.
REV. STAT. §290.145 (2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313(5) (2005), N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 201-d(6) (Consol. 2005), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2(d) (2005), S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 60-4-1 1 (2005), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-19(d) (2005), WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ § 1 1.325(3)(a) (West 2005) WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105(a)(iv) (2005).
136 Compare 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5(c) (2005):
It is not a violation of this Section for an employer to offer, impose or
have in effect a health, disability or life insurance policy that makes
distinctions between employees for the type of coverage or the price of
coverage based upon the employees' use of lawful products provided
that: (1) differential premium rates charged employees reflect a
differential cost to the employer; and (2) employers provide employees
with a statement delineating the differential rates used by insurance
carriers.
Id.
with Mo. REV. STAT. §290.145 (2005) ("nothing in this section shall prohibit an
employer from providing or contracting for health insurance benefits at a reduced
premium rate for employees who do not smoke or use tobacco products.") and W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-19(d) (2005) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit an employer from making available to smokers and other users of tobacco
products, programs, free of charge or at reduced rates, which encourage the reduction
or cessation of smoking or tobacco use."); As HIPAA gives guidance on when and
how different premiums can be charged by employers under the bona fide wellness
program rules, it is assumed that these provisions would not be preempted by the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
"' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (LexisNexis 2005).
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question, however, has a relatively straightforward answer: it was the
unlikely pairing of the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and
the tobacco lobby that led to the proliferation of these statutes.138 As
previously noted, a 1988 survey by the Administrative Management
Society revealed that six percent or roughly 6,000 companies in the
United States were refusing to hire smokers.1 39 Largely in response to
this, the combined lobbying effort of the ACLU and the tobacco
industry led to the implementation of more than two dozen state laws
protecting smokers in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 140 While some of
these laws were framed strictly as tobacco use protection laws, others
were broadened to cover such things as alcohol use, lawful products,
and lawful activity to make them more palatable to the legislatures.
1 4 1
The ACLU's stated goal has been the enactment, in every state, of
statutes that protect all working Americans from discrimination based
on their off-duty activities. 142 The ACLU, framing the issue as one of
personal rights pontificated, "When most Americans report for work,
are they supposed to have left their constitutional rights behind?"'
143
The ACLU's National Workrights Institute ("NWI") framed
this issue as "lifestyle discrimination" arguing that it was unfair and
dangerous to allow employers to discriminate against certain
employees because their private lifestyle choices are unhealthy and lead
138 Stanley Siegelman, The Right to Blow Smoke - Smokers' Rights Laws Prevent
Employers from Discriminating Against Smokers, BUSINESS & HEALTH, Sept. 199 1;
The ACLU was severely criticized for this alliance in 1993 when it was discovered
that the ACLU had received over $500,000 from the tobacco industry between 1987
and 1992 when the vast majority of the "smokers' rights bills were passed in the state
legislatures. ACLU's Link to Tobacco Firms Ripped, CHI. TRIBUNE, July 30, 1993, at
A4.
139 The National Workrights Institute, supra note 31.
140 Stephen D. Sugarman, 'Lifestyle' Discrimination in Employment, 2002, at 36,
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1000&context=ewli (last
visited Feb. 19, 2006); American Lung Association, supra note 119. According to
this website, the statutes were enacted in the following sequence broken down by
year: 1987 - Illinois; 1989- Oregon, Virginia; 1990 - Colorado, Tennessee; 1991 -
Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Wisconsin; 1992
- Minnesota, Missouri, New York, West Virginia, Wyoming; 1993 - District of
Columbia, Montana, North Dakota; 1994 - Kentucky, Mississippi; 2003 -
Connecticut; and 2005 - Rhode Island.
41 Sugarman, supra note 140.
142 American Civil Liberties Union, Lifestyle Discrimination in the Workplace: Your
Right to Privacy, http://www.aclu.org//workplacerights/gen/13384resl9981231.html,
last visited Feb. 20, 2006.
143 Siegelman, supra note 138.
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to higher health insurance costs. 14 4 The NWI further has argued that
risks are associated with nearly every personal lifestyle choice, from
smoking cigarettes, to sitting in the sun, to having children. 145  In
responding to the question of whether the NWI efforts were really just
a front for the tobacco companies, the NWI stated that lifestyle
discrimination legislation is supported by a variety of civil rights and
labor organizations and by the majority of Americans.
146
2. States Where the Laws Were Enacted
New Hampshire's experience with the smokers' rights legislation is
representative of the scenario that played out in state legislatures
throughout the country in the early 1990s. Passage of the New
Hampshire bill was pushed largely by Phillip Morris through a letter-
writing campaign, as well as the ACLU, AFL-CIO, and other smokers'
rights groups.' 47 The bill's sponsors admitted that it was brought in by
a lobbyist for Philip Morris who just happened to be the former
Speaker of the House. 148 At least one member of the New Hampshire
House of Representatives was infuriated because, rather than coming
from labor union representatives, the bill came from part of a tobacco
company's agenda. 149  Conversely, a supporter of the bill,
144 National Workrights Institute, supra note 31. Phillip Morris is however listed as
one of the supporting organizations of the ACLU's lifestyle discrimination legislation
efforts. Id.; The NWI addressing whether or not it was wrong to encourage people to
smoke with protective legislation has stated that "The government has the obligation
to insure that people understand the health risks of smoking. Government and
employers ought to help people who want to quit smoking. Ultimately, however, it is
up to the individual to decide if they want to engage in risky behavior such as
smoking or riding a motorcycle. What is wrong is using the power of the government
or the paycheck to tell other people how to live." NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE,
LIFESTYLE DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYER CONTROL OF LEGAL OFF DUTY EMPLOYEE
ACTIVITIES 9, available at http://www.workrights.org/issue lifestyle/ldbrief2.pdf.
145 National Workrights Institute, supra note 31. The ACLU has even declared that a
"State of Emergency exists in the American workplace," and "If the premises behind
such policies are allowed to stand, employers who are motivated primarily by a desire
to reduce their health care costs may well use similar means to seek control over all
health-related aspects of their employees' home lives. Siegelman, supra note 138.
146 National Workrights Institute, supra note 31.
147 Shawne K. Wickham, Smokers' Rights Bill Heats Up, N. H. SUNDAY NEWS, Mar.
31, 1991, atD1.
148 id.
149 Id. The executive director for the state's Commission for Human Rights who under
the original version of the bill would have been responsible for its enforcement
echoed concerns that the bill originated with Philip Morris instead of arising out of a
20071
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
demonstrating the debatable logic of the bill's necessity, argued "What
if people like Churchill and Roosevelt had been refused employment?
We could all be under a nonsmoker by the name of Adolf Hitler."'
150
New Jersey, which in 1991 became the fifteenth state to pass
smokers' rights legislation, provides another example of the tactics
employed by the tobacco lobby. 15 1 After the legislation's passage, the
Tobacco Institute, an industry group that supported the bill stated that
the legislation was "good news for anyone who enjoys a legal, off-duty
activity that their boss may not approve of." The Tobacco Institute
further stated that "the bill intends to protect the right to privacy, not
just for smokers, but for drinkers, the non-athletic and overweight
people. 1 52 One state senator even argued that "if employers can tell
you you can't smoke in your living room, next they might not want to
hire you because of the way you part your hair.'
' 53
Again, not all parties were pleased with the enactment of the
legislation. William Tansey, president of New Jersey's branch of the
American Heart Association, noted that "This is the initiative of a large
industry trying to protect its product. The more people addicted to
smoking, the more this industry survives."1 54  Senator Gabriel
Ambrosio, who cast the lone vote against the bill, argued that
"Smoking is by far the single most common factor in the cause of
cancer and heart disease," and that "No other voluntary human activity
is responsible for the burgeoning healthcare costs. 1 55 The bill passed
and became law, but without the signature of New Jersey's governor,
who stated that "I just do not feel comfortable affixing my signature to
a bill that somehow, at least symbolically, seems to give an imprint of
public approval to smoking." 
156
defined need stating that "If there is a problem, [with employers firing or refusing to
hire smokers] it's not very large at this time."150 id,
151 New Jersey Governor James Florio vetoed the proposed legislation when it
reached his desk the first time, explaining that it unwisely made smoking a civil right.
Undaunted, the bill's backers tried again--this time avoiding the civil rights issue by
casting the measure as a pure-and-simple labor law. Siegelman, supra note 138.
152Bethany Kandel, New Jersey to Join States Protecting Off-work Smokers,




156 Associated Press, New Jersey Law Bans Employers from Firing Off-the-Job
Smokers, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1991, at C12.
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3. States Where the Laws were Vetoed
At least four states legislatures passed smokers' rights bills only to
have them vetoed by each state's respective Governor. For example, in
February 1993, the Virginia General Assembly, on the same day it
gutted a bill to restrict public smoking, enacted a bill to protect the
rights of smokers in a vivid display of the power of Virginia's tobacco
lobby.'57 The bill's supporters pointed out that the bill protected
smokers' privacy, and perhaps more importantly, that tobacco
accounted for twenty-six percent of the value of all the exports from
Virginia. 158 The bill, however, was largely symbolic in that it included
no penalties against employers who violated its provisions, and did not
permit aggrieved workers to sue.159 But Virginia Governor L. Douglas
Wilder snubbed Virginia's powerful tobacco industry by vetoing the
bill because he believed it would elevate a dangerous habit to the status
of a legally protected right. 160 Wilder, himself an ex-smoker, said he
was offended by the suggestion that smokers deserve the same type of
civil rights shield that had been used to fight prejudice against blacks
and other minorities.' 61
The Michigan legislature likewise passed a bill that would have
protected not only smoking but also alcohol consumption. The original
bill was intended only to protect smokers, but was widened to include
other certain legal consumable products.' 62  Governor John Engler
vetoed the bill stating that despite the fact the word tobacco had been
removed from the original bill, it continued to be a smokers' rights
bill. 163 Engler cited among the reasons for vetoing the bill the fact that
tobacco kills more than 15,000 Michigan citizens each year and that
smoking-attributable diseases sapped more than $2 billion each year
from the state's economy in medical expenses, lost work time, and lost
157 John F. Harris & Peter Baker, Tobacco Prevails in Richmond; Smoking




160 John F. Harris, Pro-Smoker Bill Doused by Wilder; Governor Unmoved by
Tobacco Lobby, WASH. POST, March 30, 1993, Al.
161 Id.
162 PR Newswire, MADD, Michigan Asks Gov. Engler to Veto Expanded 'Smokers
Rights' Bill, Dec. 11, 1992, at State and Regional News; Engler's Veto of 1992
Michigan Smokers' Rights Employment Bill S 484,
http://medicolegal.tripod.com/englerveto1992.htm, (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
163 Engler's Veto of 1992 Michigan Smokers' Rights Employment Bill S 484, supra
note 162.
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productivity. 164 Engler was also concerned that the bill would tend to
trivialize fundamental rights like protection against discrimination
based on race, gender, political ideology, or religious affiliation and
would elevate the use of nicotine to a protected right.'
65
Former President Bill Clinton, then the Governor of Arkansas,
also vetoed a smoker's rights bill in February 1991, citing fears that it
could lead to the prohibition of smoke-free workplaces.' 66 Clinton, in a
letter to Arkansas' state House Speaker John Lipton further stated that
smoking was an acquired behavior and that with "the overwhelming
evidence of the toll it takes every year in disease and death, it should
not be accorded legal protection like Freedom of Speech, nor should
smokers be a protected class like those who have been wrongly
discriminated against because of race, sex, age, or physical
handicaps."' 
67
A final illustration of the battle over state smokers' rights laws
comes from Florida, where at the urging of tobacco lobbyists, an
amendment stating that employers could not discriminate against
employees who smoke during their free time was added to a bill
designed to dramatically restrict smoking in public places. 168  Jim
Burke, the representative who introduced the amendment, stated that it
was a civil rights issue. 169 This prompted a candid response from fellow
representative Lois Frankel who stated "Oh great. We have Martin
Luther King, Rosa Parks, Susan B. Anthony, and now Philip
Morris."'170  The Florida smokers' right bill too was ultimately vetoed
by the state's Governor, Lawton Chiles, in April 1992.171
4. Why State Laws Protecting Smokers Fail the Public
Regardless of the proffered rationale of these statutes, ultimately they
had little to do with civil rights or personal privacy. Instead, they had
everything to do with appeasing a powerful lobbying group. The
164 id.
165 Id.
166 Michael Arbanas, 'Smoker's Rights'Bill Vetoed, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb.
27, 1991.
167 Id.




171 United Press International, Florida Governor Snuffs Out "Smokers Rights", Apr.
10, 1992.
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ACLU claimed the motivating factor behind these statutes was to enact
lifestyle discrimination legislation to prevent employers from
discriminating against individuals for personal lifestyle choices. Why
then did the vast majority of the enacted and proposed statutes
specifically address tobacco use only? The number of states that
addressed tobacco use only would be even higher if some states had not
re-worded their statutes to include protection for lawful consumable
products or lawful conduct. At a time when more is discovered daily
about the harms of smoking, and governments at state and local levels
implement public smoking bans, 172 these statutes stand out as a glaring
example of the ability of a powerful special interest group to have its
personal agenda forced upon the constituency.
It is not just the obvious special-interest purpose of this
legislation that is problematic, but the contradictory public health
message these statutes present about the health risks and societal harms
of smoking. Admittedly, the United States has failed to present a
consistent public health approach to the issue of smoking. While the
government continues to permit the tobacco industry to manufacture
and sell its undeniably harmful products, at the same time, the
government discourages the public from smoking cigarettes through
taxation, education and public smoking bans. While the Surgeon
General and organizations such as the American Cancer Society and
American Lung Association exert efforts to discourage and educate the
public about the dangers of smoking, state legislatures acting at the
behest of the tobacco industry enacted statutes that implicitly endorsed
or, at the least, condoned tobacco use. 173  Instead of delivering a
consistent message condemning smoking, these state legislatures have
shielded smokers from condemnation with specifically tailored statutes.
172 See Steve Patterson, Cook County Bans Smoking, Starting Next Year; Few Vocal
Critics of Measure that Takes Effect Next March, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006 at
8; Steve Patterson, It's Lights out Today All Over Town, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 16,
2006 at 16; City of Calabasas, Secondhand Smoking Ordinance FAQ,
http://www.cityofcalabasas.com/secondhandsmoke-faq.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2006). These are just some of the many examples of local governments taking action
to curb exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (secondhand smoke).
173 The tobacco industry itself even acknowledges the dangers of smoking as Phillip
Morris, for example, maintains a website listing the health risks associated with
cigarette smoking, stating in part that "Philip Morris USA agrees with the
overwhelming medical and scientific consensus that cigarette smoking causes lung
cancer, heart disease, emphysema and other serious diseases in smokers." Phillip
Morris USA - Health Issues, http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/health-issues/ (last
visited Mar. 21, 2006).
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It is, however, not the contradictory message these statutes perpetrate
that is most disconcerting, but the false credibility these statutes give to
the argument that people have a right to smoke.
One of the consistent themes throughout the push to enact these
statutes was that smoking was a civil rights and privacy issue, with
proponents arguing that smokers were being impermissibly
discriminated against. As this Comment has demonstrated, courts have
uniformly established that there is no right to smoke, and smokers do
not constitute a suspect class. It is repugnant to the concepts of civil
rights and equal protection to propose that what is ultimately a
voluntary behavior is worthy of the same level of consideration as
immutable characteristics such as race, gender and disability. Yet
many groups and individuals made such an argument during the
initiative to have these statutes enacted, taking what is in reality a
public health issue and distorting it with notions of liberty and privacy.
Also flawed is the argument that smoking is a personal privacy
issue. It has been clearly demonstrated that environment tobacco
smoke is seriously harmful to nonsmokers, causing tens of thousands of
deaths each year. For smokers to claim that it is a personal choice
issue, when their behavior has serious health consequences for all
members of society, is simply a ridiculous proposition. Further, it is
not just smokers who bear the burden of paying for the cost of
smoking. Society, collectively, is burdened with the unnecessary
medical care costs created because of smoking, costs that otherwise
would likely not exist. With the majority of working-age Americans
receiving health insurance benefits through employers and with the cost
of medical care in this country rapidly increasing, employers have
become increasingly burdened by rising health care costs. Employers
should, therefore, be free to choose whether they will bear more of the
burden imposed by smokers than they already do.
VII. DIFFERENTIATING SMOKING FROM OTHER FORMS
OF LIFESTYLE DISCRIMINATION
One of the principal arguments made by groups such as the ACLU and
the NWI is that employer discrimination against employees based on
tobacco usage is really just one form of lifestyle discrimination, with
discrimination based on factors such as alcohol and food consumption,
and recreational activity also on the rise. The argument often made is
that if discrimination is permitted on one basis, namely smoking, it
would lead to discrimination being permissible based on any of these
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factors. This argument is referred to as the "slippery slope argument,"
a staple of those in the legal community. This is simply not the
case, as smoking tobacco is, by its very nature, inherently different
from any other behavior or lifestyle decision that is mentioned in the
context of lifestyle discrimination. Simply stated, cigarettes are
harmful regardless of type or brand. It is tobacco that has the unique
distinction of being the only legal consumable product that is harmful
when used exactly as intended. The same cannot be said for other
consumable products such as alcohol and food. 174  Obviously, even
alcohol and food can be abused, as is readily evident from the
proliferation of alcoholism and the ongoing epidemic of obesity in the
United States. But again, unlike tobacco, alcohol and food by their
nature are not harmful products. In fact, while there is some debate, it
is believed that alcohol when used in moderation potentially has health
benefits. 175 Food too by its nature is not harmful and is essential to
maintaining life. Again, food too has the potential for abuse and
admittedly not all food is nutritional. While any amount of tobacco that
is consumed is harmful; the same simply cannot be said for alcohol and
food. It is, however, not only consumable products that have been used
as talking points by proponents of lifestyle discrimination protection.
Recreational activities, such as playing basketball, or more high
risk activities, such as rock climbing, are illustrative of another
potential source of "lifestyle discrimination." According to groups like
the NWI, employers may be leery of employees who engage in these
types of activities because of the potential for higher medical claims
due to an increased likelihood of injury. While it is inevitable that
some individuals participating in these activities will suffer injuries, it
is highly implausible that an employer, who theoretically is trying to
control medical costs by engaging in "lifestyle discrimination," would
try to avoid employing individuals who engage in physical activities,
which undeniably have health benefits. For example, if employers
174 In fact, the only alcohol-centered cases presented by the NWI in its legislative
briefing paper on lifestyle discrimination focused on employees of breweries being
terminated for being observed drinking rival breweries' products. NATIONAL
WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, LIFESTYLE DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYER CONTROL OF
LEGAL OFF DUTY EMPLOYEE ACTIVITIES 6 (2005), available at
http://www.workrights.org/issue lifestyle/ldbrief2.pdf.
175 See MayoClinic.com, Alcohol and Your Health: Weighing the Pros. and Cons,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/alcohol/SC00024 (last visited Mar. 25, 2006);
Harvard School of Public Health, Alcohol: Nutrition Source,
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/alcohol.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2006).
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were that concerned about higher claims filed by employees because
they participate in dangerous activities, then perhaps employers should
forbid their employees to drive to work, as over 42,000 individuals
were killed and over 2.7 million were injured in motor vehicle
accidents in 2004 alone.
176
VIII. CONCLUSION
The actions of companies such as Weyco and Scotts clearly illustrate
the escalating tension between an employee's personal lifestyle choices
and an employer's bottom line. So long as employers remain the
primary source of health insurance for working age Americans, and
health care costs continue to increase at their current rates, this tension
will continue to escalate. The most common target for employers thus
far has been cigarette smoking, a trend that from all indications is likely
to accelerate. As this Comment has demonstrated, there is no "right to
smoke" nor are smokers a distinct or suspect class. Further, as nicotine
addiction is not treated as a disability under the ADA, the only
protection from employment discrimination that smokers can rely on
exists in the form of state statutes prohibiting employment
discrimination based on tobacco use. But these statutes have been
demonstrated to be the ill-conceived offspring of the tobacco lobby,
whose real concern is protecting its own product and not the protection
of workers. These statutes promote an unsound public health message,
and offer smokers unjustified protection, even as their behavior exerts
severe physical and economic harms upon society. As this Comment
has illustrated, employers, if they choose to, should be free to refuse to
employ smokers. Even with concerns over lifestyle discrimination,
smoking has been shown to be a uniquely harmful behavior that will
not automatically pave the way for further behavior and lifestyle
employment discrimination.
176 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, MOTOR VEHICLE
TRAFFIC CRASH FATALITY COUNTS AND INJURY ESTIMATES FOR 2004 at 8 (2005),
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-
30/NCSA/PPT/2004AnnualAssessment.pdf Compare this to the fact that only 30
people were killed in North America in 2005 in skydiving accidents. Admittedly
though, almost everyone rides in cars, and not everyone skydives. Dropzone.com,
Skydiving Fatalities: 2005/North America,
http://www.dropzone.com/fatalities/2005/NorthAmerica/index.shtml (last visited
Mar. 26, 2006).
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